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In higher education, a sizeable fraction of students fail their courses, and a substantial 
minority drop out. This may be due to a lack of study effort, possibly driven by uncertainty 
about returns to study effort, high discounting of the future, or (mis)perception of their own 
ability. If intrinsic motivation does not suffice to induce satisfactory effort, then what 
interventions might help to increase student effort and performance? A common tool to engage 
students with their studies is to provide online computer learning assessments in the form of a 
“quiz.” This study evaluates how incentives affect quiz effort. We first compare the efficiency 
of different incentives in inducing a student to provide effort, exploiting weekly incentive 
variation for all students. To evaluate longer-run effects of quiz participation on learning, we 
rely on a natural experiment where two cohorts were subjected to different sets of quiz 
incentives. In particular, the control cohort was offered quizzes, but these were not part of their 
course assessment. In contrast, the second (treated) cohort were rewarded with assessment 
weightings from grades obtained in some pre-determined weekly quizzes which counted 
towards the course’s final grade. To facilitate a comparison between the treated and control 
groups we use propensity score matching to provide evidence that the two cohorts do not 
statistically differ on observable and usually unobserved characteristics. We can then assess 
how assessment rules affect course performance.  
The data pertain to two cohorts of first year undergraduate economics students at a large 
college of the University of London (for which we have records of participation in weekly 
online quizzes for the course we investigate). The quizzes are designed to foster continuous 
learning so that quiz participation may help increase students’ learning and performance. In 
practice, the simple provision of these educational resources does not suffice to engage 
students; quiz participation in non-incentivized weeks is only 29%. However, students were 
exposed to varying incentives (or lack thereof) across weeks, and we estimate their effort 
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responses accordingly. In particular, we investigate the relative effects of: i) a participation 
incentive, i.e., the provision of additional study material conditional on quiz participation, ii) a 
tournament incentive in the form of a book voucher for the best quiz performance of the week, 
and iii) assessment weighting, whereby the grade obtained in the quiz counts towards the course 
grade. We find that the participation and tournament incentives are ineffective in raising quiz 
effort. In contrast, however, even small assessment weights of 2.5% to 5% of the final grade 
have a large impact; they increase weekly quiz participation by 42 (respectively 62) percentage 
points. This compares with a 73 percentage point increase in participation when the quiz is 
made compulsory. 
Effort responses to incentives differ by ability as measured via university entry grades. 
Lower ability students are less likely to exert effort in the absence of incentives, potentially 
due to lower intrinsic motivation to study. Frey and Jegen (2002) suggest that extrinsic 
motivation, e.g., incentives, can counteract the lack of intrinsic motivation, but they also warn 
of the opposite effect when intrinsic motivation is high. We do not find detrimental effects of 
assessment weighting on effort among high ability students (who are more likely to participate 
in quizzes in the absence of incentives). However, it induces relatively higher quiz effort among 
lower and median ability students, in line with extrinsic motivation inducing this group to study 
harder. As a result it would seem that assessment weighting helps to “level the playing field.”  
Assessment weighting may contemporaneously increase effort in incentivized weeks 
but could discourage effort in non-incentivized weeks. We investigate this effort ‘displacement 
hypothesis’, which could reduce the effectiveness of incentives inter-temporally, using two 
complementary approaches: first, we estimate dynamic models of effort choice using leads and 
lags of the incentive treatments; secondly, we use the first week of the year in which students 
did not yet know about the incentive scheme as a benchmark. Both approaches yield the same 
result: we find no displacement, i.e., there is no shifting of effort during the term, and 
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assessment weighting unambiguously increases total quiz effort over the term. Interestingly in 
the first week of the year, and in other non-incentivized weeks, the quiz participation rates are 
close between the two cohorts, highlighting their similarity. 
In the second part of the paper, we investigate whether rewarding effort in some weeks 
does indeed increase exam performance. To do so, we exploit a natural experiment; Cohort 2, 
our treatment cohort, was subjected to six assessment weighted quizzes instead of two 
compulsory ones; other participation incentives remained the same. Despite compulsory 
quizzes having a larger effect on weekly participation, the treated students completed 1.3 
additional quizzes (out of a 7 quizzes available before the in-term test) per term, on average. 
We then use propensity score matching methods to account for cohort composition differences 
and exploit the exogenous variation in quiz assessment to identify its impact on student 
performance. We find that a 10% assessment weighting, split across three quizzes with smaller 
weights, increases exam performance substantially by 0.27 of a standard deviation. Two 
mechanisms are potentially at play; for the treated cohort, the frequency of incentivized quizzes 
was greater; second, effort in assessed quizzes might be more productive than in unweighted 
compulsory quizzes, as such more learning took place during quizzes for the treated cohort.  
This reduced form effect could be driven by unobserved differences between the two 
cohorts and not by changes in the incentives faced by students during the term. However, we 
note that in the first week of the year, the quiz participation rates of the two cohorts were 
similar, so they do not appear to differ in intrinsic motivation. Furthermore, we test that the 
performance improvement is driven by the increase in quiz participation and not directly by a 
cohort effect nor by changes in the productivity of quiz; i.e. the grade effects are driven by the 
increased quiz completion and not by any other differences between the two cohorts. The 
performance improvement is (quantitatively and qualitatively) consistent with our estimates of 
the effort response to assessment weighting, and the estimated grade returns to additional quiz 
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effort. The latter amounts to a grade increase by 0.165 of a standard deviation per additional 
completed quiz. The effort return is nonlinear and concentrated around a completion of at least 
4 out of 7 quizzes. Compared to the initial regime, assessment weighting increases the 
proportion of students completing at least 4 tests per term by 40%. We also provide evidence 
of longer-run effects of assessment weighting and find similar size effects (if not always 
precisely estimated) on final exam grades, and on the overall course grade in the treated course, 
in other first year modules and in related second year courses. 
Insights from behavioral economics suggest that incentives (nudges) can increase 
educational effort by providing students with non-financial returns to their input or a better 
study structure (see reviews by Lavecchia et al. (2016), Gneezy, Meier and Rey-Biel (2011) 
and Koch, Nafziger and Skyt-Nielsen (2015)). As such, various studies have considered 
assessment weights in higher education. Pozo and Stull (2006) run an experiment where an 
initial math assessment counted (or not) towards the final grade; they report greater levels of 
effort on that assessment among incentivized students and an improvement in the overall score 
by 2 percentage points, especially for weaker students. Their estimated effect is the joint impact 
of the provision of math training and assessment weighting, which may both improve 
performance separately. Closer to our study, other papers have estimated the effect of 
compulsory/assessed homework on students’ exam performance. Grodner and Rupp (2013) 
randomize compulsion to homework within a cohort, and report improvement in test scores by 
6%. Trost and Salehi-Isfahani (2012) also randomize compulsory participation to homework 
within a section in different weeks. For three topics, students were randomly assigned to a 
voluntary or compulsory assessment group. Students in the compulsory group perform better 
in the short-run, but this effect disappears by the end of semester.   
Rather than compulsion, Emerson and Menken (2011) randomize, within section, 
assessment weighting of homework representing up to 18% of final grade. The treated group 
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outperforms control group students by 4% on average - but only in tests directly covered by 
the assessed homework (Emerson and Menken, 2011) – and not the Test of Understanding in 
College Economics. Similarly, Grove and Wasserman (2006) rely on a natural experiment, 
leading to differences in assessment weighting for homework (15% towards the final grade) 
within a cohort, and report a final grade improvement of 2 percentage points. Overall, the 
literature has provided evidence that in the short-run both compulsion and assessment 
weighting can be effective at increasing grades. 
We provide additional evidence in favor of the effectiveness of assessment weighting 
in raising effort and increasing performance, extending the literature in four important ways: 
first, we test the effect of several incentives within the same student population and find 
assessment weighting to be most effective if compared to prizes and participation incentives. 
Indeed, we find that a 5% assessment weight generates an increase in that week quiz 
participation that is 86% of the increase generated by compulsion. Second, since students face 
different incentives week by week, we can control for students’ unobserved characteristics in 
our analysis of the effort impact of incentives. Third, we investigate heterogeneity effects with 
respect to gender and pre-determined ability and include usually unobserved characteristics 
such as risk attitudes. We find that effort increases are highest among lower and median ability 
students: since these are students with low observed effort in the absence of incentives, 
extrinsic motivation through incentives activates this group’s effort. At the same time, we find 
no evidence that incentives crowd out intrinsic motivation to study among those with initially 
high effort (who also tend to be high ability students). 
Our fourth and main contribution is to show in detail that inducing effort via assessment 
weighting does not displace effort elsewhere—neither inter-temporally nor inter-subject. Final 
grades, pass rates and grades in other modules were not negatively affected by the additional 
effort provided on the treated module during term time. In contrast, our results point to 
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increases in overall effort throughout the course, and potentially positive spillover effects on 
performance in other courses in the same year, and related courses in the second year. We thus 
conclude that frequent assessment weighting has unequivocally positive effects on course 
effort, and even results in better academic performance than less frequent compulsory quizzes. 
Grades do not only increase at the mean; performance increases are concentrated around the 
median of the grade distribution, narrowing the performance gap. 
Our results also contribute to the broader literature which considers effective incentive 
mechanisms in the context of educational performance. Fryer (2011, 2013) concludes from a 
series of experiments in schools that incentives rewarding inputs tend to be more successful at 
generating grade improvements than incentives targeting outputs. Financial incentives, which 
tend to reward output, tend to yield small performance improvements—also in studies focusing 
on higher education (see Lavecchia, Liu and Oreopoulos (2016) for a review). These moderate 
effects may be a consequence of the crowding out of intrinsic motivation (Frey and Jegen, 
2002) or a mismatch between achievement targets and students’ ability (Camerer and Hogarth, 
1999). The magnitude of the performance effect in our study is similar to those achieved 
through large financial incentives awarded for increased grades (see Angrist et al., 2009, 2014, 
Leuven et al. 2010, Cha and Patel 2010, and Barrow and Rouse 2013). However, our effects 
are achieved at much lower overall cost. Additionally, financial incentives may be difficult to 
scale up considering the limited resources of higher education institutions. Our results are 
consistent with the hypothesis that rewarding inputs leads to increased performance, and this 
can be achieved using a cheap and easy-to-implement incentive mechanism: assessment 
weights. Of course, compulsion has an even larger effect on quiz participation but there may 
be reasons to prefer assessed tests, which we have not tested in this paper. Compulsion, while 
good at increasing quiz participation may not lead to as much study effort as assessment, since 
they are no rewards to effort, thus leading to a smaller continuous learning effect. Assessed 
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tests, by reducing the weight on final exams, decrease performance volatility as a “bad day” 
will have less impact on the final grade in a course with frequent assessments that carry small 
weights, which anecdotal evidence suggests is disliked by students. Finally, compulsion also 
leads to administrative burden to assess the validity of extenuating circumstances of students 
who failed to comply with the compulsion. This administrative burden increases linearly in the 
amount of compulsory tests administered.  
In the remainder of the paper, we first describe the institutional set-up and the data and 
identification strategy (Section 2). Section 3 then presents empirical results, and Section 4 
concludes.  
 
2. Study design and Data 
The study was conducted on the course “Principles of Economics” (henceforth: “Principles”), 
which is compulsory for all students enrolled in economics at a large college of the University 
of London. There is no self-selection into the course or any of its delivery components (i.e., the 
lecture or seminar). “Principles” represents a quarter of students’ first year undergraduate 
curriculum load. It is a “high stakes” module which students need to pass in order to progress 
to the second year. “Principles” runs over two terms (Fall and Spring) for a total of 20 weeks. 
Each week, students attend a two-hour lecture and a (compulsory) one-hour small group 
seminar. All course materials are available online via a dedicated interface, which also hosts a 
set of on-line multiple choice quizzes testing the understanding of the concepts taught in the 
previous week.  
The two course instructors (each teaching for one term), contents, materials, delivery, lecture 
times, communication and the quiz question database remain identical across the two years 
under study. In both years, students were informed about quizzes in the same way and 
encouraged to participate. After each lecture, students could complete quizzes within a 
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predefined window of one to three days. After the due date they received information on their 
overall score, their answers, the correct solution to each question, and in some cases detailed 
explanations. For assessed quizzes, students were given a 60 minute completion window within 
a specified 24-hour period. For each student, questions were randomly drawn from a large 
question bank. 
In a given week, all students faced the same incentive to complete the quiz. However, these 
incentives varied across weeks; Table 1 reports the timing across weeks. Incentives were 
repeated at least twice throughout the year and their timing across terms differs so that they are 
unlikely to capture week-specific effects. This “within-student” design allows us to account for 
students’ unobserved characteristics.  
The first incentive is a simple participation incentive where students gain access to detailed 
seminar exercise solutions if they participate in the weekly quiz (“Solution”), conditional on 
achieving at least a very low quiz grade of 30%. The second is a performance incentive in the 
form of a £20 book voucher for the best quiz performance (“Voucher”), whose winner is 
announced in class/by email. We expect this tournament to increase quiz participation and 
performance among those students who believe they have a chance of winning, i.e., those with 
higher ability (or those who are overconfident). At the same time, a tournament setting may 
have detrimental effects on others via a discouragement effect (Cason et al., 2010).  
Additionally, we exploit a natural experiment in which, for one cohort (cohort 2), in each term 
three quizzes carried assessment weighting: two out of the weekly online quizzes contribute 
2.5% (“Assessed 2.5%”) and one counts 5% (“Assessed 5%”) towards the final course grade, 
amounting to a total of 10% per term, and 20% for the full year. The final exam accounts for 
the remaining 80%, while for Cohort 1, it accounts for 100% of the final course grade. If these 
assessment weights are salient enough, we expect an increase in student participation (and 
performance) in assessed quizzes relative to non-assessed ones. For the first cohort, only two 
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quizzes were mandatory (“Compulsory”). Students were informed that participation would be 
a prerequisite for entry to take the final exam. This threat was not strictly enforced, but we 
expect it to be credible among first year students. In several weeks, quizzes were not 
incentivized, so that only the desire to obtain feedback or intrinsic motivation induced students 
to participate.  
Our data consists of the electronic records of quiz participation and in-term tests for two 
consecutive cohorts of students. We match it with administrative data containing information 
on final exam performance, students’ characteristics, and ability (school completion grades). 
We further obtain a set of measures of preference parameters from a questionnaire survey, 
which has been conducted for several years in the first week of lectures. Excluding repeating 
students and students that drop out during the year, Cohort 1 consisted of 206 students, and 
Cohort 2 of 242 students. More information on our sample is provided in Appendix B. 
In our analysis, we first estimate the effect of incentives on weekly quiz participation 
(q). Specifically, we compare students’ responses to different types of incentives to participate 
in the weekly quiz. To capture unobserved heterogeneity, we specify the following model with 
individual fixed effects, 𝜇𝑖: 
𝑞𝑖𝑡 =∝ + ∑ 𝛽𝑍 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑧𝑡𝑧 + ∑ 𝛿𝑘 𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑡𝑘 +   𝜑𝑇𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,  (1) 
where the subscripts refer to individual i at time t (measured in weeks). Each individual is 
exposed to a set of z incentives that are week-specific. All time-invariant student 
characteristics, including pre-determined ability, motivation, or work ethic, are absorbed in the 
individual fixed effect (𝜇𝑖). The xikt term conditions for the k measures of weekly variation in 
academic burden, such as assignment deadlines in other courses. We allow for time fixed 
effects T in the form of a term dummy and a term-specific linear trend in week. Standard errors 
are clustered at the week and cohort level, i.e., within a given incentive treatment, so as to 
account for any unobserved correlation between observations in a given week.  
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In addition to estimating the impact of incentivized quizzes relative to non-incentivized ones, 
we estimate additional specifications to test for potential displacement of effort between 
incentivized and non-incentivized weeks by using only the first week of the year as the control 
condition. Students were only informed about the weekly incentives after the first week and 
may treat all other non-incentivized weeks as potentially affected by the treatment. This allows 
us to test for displacement of effort between incentivized and non-incentivized weeks.  
To assess possible displacement further, we additionally estimate model (1) including lags 
(leads) of incentives: 
𝑞𝑖𝑡 =∝ + ∑ 𝛽𝑍 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑧𝑡𝑧 + ∑ 𝛾𝑍 𝐿(𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑧𝑡)𝑧 + ∑ 𝛿𝑘 𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑡𝑘 +   𝜑𝑇𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , (2) 
where L is a lag (lead) operator; i.e., we assess whether the last week’s or the next week’s 
incentive has an effect on this week’s participation behavior. 
Next, we sum up the number of submitted weekly quizzes before the in-term exam (𝑄 = ∑ 𝑞) 
to capture the effect of assessment weighting on overall quiz effort. We obtain two overall 
effort measures for each student, one for each term. We then estimate the effect of assessment 
weighting on overall quiz participation using the following specification: 
  𝑄𝑖𝑝 =∝𝑄+ 𝜃𝑄𝐶𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝑄𝑘 𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑘 + 𝛾𝑄𝑃 + 𝜀𝑄𝑖𝑝 ,    
 (3) 
where 𝐶𝑖 is a dummy that takes the value 1 if individual i is exposed to assessment weighting 
incentives, and P is a term dummy.  
Of course, quiz participation is only of interest if it has a long-term effect on exam performance. 
A similar reduced-form model to (3) is used to estimate the effect of assessment weight 
incentives on student performance, according to the following model: 
           𝑆𝑖𝑝 =∝𝑆+ 𝜃𝑆𝐶𝑖  + ∑ 𝛿𝑆𝑘  𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑘 + 𝛾𝑆𝑃 + 𝜀𝑆𝑖𝑝 ,     (4) 
where 𝑆𝑖𝑝 denotes the in-term grade of individual i in term P. Our identification strategy relies 
on differences in the incentives to provide effort between the two groups. Our estimates would 
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be biased if there were composition differences between the two cohorts. Columns 1 and 2 in 
Table 2 show some group differences. On average, Cohort 2 is about 3 months younger; has a 
larger fraction of males (64% relative to 53%); more economics majors; is of slightly lower 
academic ability - as measured by entry grades - and contains more British students. These 
compositional differences may have been due to higher enrollment rates in cohort 2 in 
anticipation of an impending reform in education financing which increased tuition fees (for 
subsequent cohorts). These compositional differences may induce a sample selection resulting 
in a downward bias in our estimation, as Cohort 2, which is affected by the assessment 
incentive, is slightly academically weaker at entry into university. To overcome this problem, 
we rebalance our sample using propensity score matching. We match based on age, gender, 
nationality, degree major and ability. 94% of Cohort 2 individuals are matched, highlighting 
the large amount of common support between the two groups. (see Appendix B). Columns 3 
and 4 of Table 2 show that the matched cohorts are, as expected, balanced in terms of the 
observable characteristics used in the matching process (see Panel A). In Panel B, we show 
that the two cohorts are also balanced with regard to usually unobserved characteristics that 
were not part of the matching procedure. We rely here on survey measures of students’ 
patience, risk attitude, and their self-confidence, which have been shown to be related to 
academic performance and a wide range of economic choices (for an overview, see Dohmen 
et al., 2010; for more detail, refer to Appendix A.1). We take this as further evidence for the 
quality of our matching approach; the two groups are now identical in terms of observable and 
(potentially) unobservable characteristics. For the remainder of the analysis, we reweight 
individuals in the control group (cohort 1) using their matching frequency.  
To further alleviate concerns that the reduced form effects are driven by cohort differences that 
are unrelated to cohort composition, we also estimate the direct effect of quiz participation on 
exam performance, accounting for cohort effect. Moreover, we introduce an interaction 
13 
 
between the number of quizzes completed and cohort to test whether the effect of quiz 
participation on exam grades differ between cohorts.  
𝑆𝑖𝑝 =∝𝑆+ 𝜗𝑆𝑄𝑖𝑝 +  𝜃𝑆𝐶𝑖 + 𝜋𝑆𝑄𝑖𝑝𝐶𝑖  + ∑ 𝛿𝑘 𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑘 + 𝛾𝑃 + 𝜀𝑖𝑝 ,   (5) 
For the reduced form effects presented in (4) to be interpreted in a causal way, we would 
need the estimates in (5) on the direct cohort effect (𝜃𝑆) and the interaction term (𝜋𝑆) to be 
insignificant; i.e. the effects on grades are driven only by quiz participation, not by differences 
between cohorts. 
Panel C of Table 2 contains descriptive measures of the change in effort and 
performance across the matched groups. Students in Cohort 2 are significantly more active in 
continuous learning via quizzes: They participate in 23% more quizzes than Cohort 1 and their 
quiz grades are 10% higher. Even the time spent on each quiz increases significantly for this 
group. Term-time exam grades are 3.5 points or 5% higher, and final exam grades are up by 
3.3 points, or 6.5%.  
 
3. Results 
3.1 Incentives and Weekly Effort 
In this section, we investigate the effectiveness of different incentives for students to 
engage in continuous learning. Quiz participation rates in week 1, our baseline week before 
any treatment announcement, is indistinguishable between the treatment and control group 
(50% vs. 53%, two-sided, t-value=0.52), suggesting that the intrinsic motivation of the two 
cohorts is similar at the onset of the academic year. The low quiz participation in weeks without 
incentives suggests that students’ demand for feedback is low when obtaining such feedback 
requires unrewarded effort (see Figure 1). Both cohorts allocate their effort similarly in the 
absence of incentives, as their participation in weeks without incentives is almost identical.  
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“Soft” incentives—book vouchers and the provision of seminar solutions, marked by 
dotted vertical lines in Figure 1—do not appear to have much impact on the quiz participation 
of either cohort. In contrast, quiz effort differs markedly in weeks with assessment weights for 
the second cohort (marked by dashed (5% weighting) and solid vertical lines (2.5% weighting)) 
or for the first cohort only, compulsion (dashed vertical lines). In weeks with assessment 
weights, participation in Cohort 2 spikes at above 70% and is substantially higher than 
participation in the same weeks in Cohort 1, particularly during the Spring term. These figures 
suggest a strong reaction to assessment incentives. Indeed, 2.5% weighting results in a 
participation rate that is 83% of the participation rate achieved in a compulsory assessment. 
These observations are confirmed in the econometric analysis (see Table 3). We estimate the 
fixed effects model from equation (1) relative to non-incentivized weeks to identify incentive 
effects on student effort. We use the matched sample and cluster standard errors at the cohort-
week level.  
The “Solution” incentive, which gives access to problem-set solutions conditional on 
quiz participation, has no statistically significant effect, possibly because students can share 
problem-set solutions. The £20 book voucher for the best quiz performance reduces 
participation marginally by 9 percentage points, but the effect is not statistically significant. 
This may have been expected since, from the perspective of the individual student, this 
tournament had a low probability of winning a small prize and targeted only top performance, 
thus potentially crowding out intrinsic motivation (Fryer 2013; Gneezy et al., 2011).  
“Hard” incentives, such as compulsion or assessment weights, in contrast, have a large 
positive effect on quiz participation. An assessment weight of 2.5% boosts quiz participation 
by 42 percentage points—a large increase given the low weight of the assessment. Doubling 
the incentive weight to 5% increases quiz participation by 62 percentage points, i.e., only about 
1.5 times the effect of the lower weight. In comparison, declaring an assessment as compulsory 
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increases participation by 73 percentage points; as such an assessment weight of 5% is 85% as 
effective as compulsion. Therefore, assessment weights have a substantial effect on quiz 
participation.  
We always reject the null hypothesis of (pairwise) equal parameter estimates for these 
three incentives at the 5% significance level (see bottom of Table 3), suggesting that effort 
increases with the assessment weight and is highest in a compulsory quiz. Our results are not 
sensitive to the fixed effects specification and are very similar when we use the full 
(unmatched) compared to the matched sample (see column 2 of Table 3). Importantly, the 
coefficient on the Cohort 2 dummy is not statistically significant, thus confirming the graphical 
evidence from Figure 1 that the two cohorts do not systematically differ in their intrinsic 
motivation to participate in quizzes. Additionally, we allow for an interaction term between 
incentives and cohort, and find no evidence that students from different cohorts react 
differently to the same incentives (see Table C2 in the appendix). Finally, ability is positively 
correlated with effort (Table 3, Column 3). Students in ability quartile 1 (respectively 2) are 7 
(10) percentage points less likely to participate in a given quiz than top ability students. These 
estimates are significant at the 1% level. However, including ability controls does not alter the 
mean incentive effects on quiz participation. Quiz participation for students in the 3rd ability 
quartile does not significantly differ from the one of top ability students.  
Student effort may also manifest itself in other dimensions, such as the intensity of 
participation (i.e., the time spent completing a quiz, normalized by the number of questions per 
quiz), and the productivity of effort which we measure through the quiz grade. Note that these 
variables are observed conditional on quiz participation, clearly creating selection between 
incentivized and non-incentivized weeks. Since, in the absence of incentives, more 
able/motivated students were more likely to participate, this selection biases our results towards 
zero. In spite of this bias, we still find statistically significant increases in intensity and 
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effectiveness of effort in weeks with hard incentives (see Table C.1 in the appendix): 
incentivized students spent 4 to 7 additional minutes per 10 quiz questions. The effort increase 
in weeks with 5% assessment weighting is comparable to that of a compulsory quiz. At a 
baseline of 25 minutes per quiz (and an average of 16.7 questions) in non-incentivized weeks, 
these effects are substantial. We find no increase in effort intensity from providing a soft 
incentive. Effort productivity also increases for the two strongest incentives, compulsion and 
5% weighting, and we observe a small but statistically insignificant grade improvement with a 
2.5% weight. Assessment weighting incentivizes increased effort in quizzes along all 
dimensions in a consistent manner.  
In summary, the two cohorts are very similar in their intrinsic motivation to participate 
in (non-incentivized) quizzes and in their reaction to soft incentives. Neither tournament nor 
participation incentives are effective in encouraging effort, likely due to lack of salience, 
adverse effects on those who are unlikely to win, or a low probability of winning. However, 
even small assessment weights of 2.5 and 5% increase quiz participation substantially, by 42 
to 62 percentage points, and also increase the effort put into quizzes. 
 
3.2 Unintended Consequences? Effort displacement versus Effort Spillovers 
When faced with a mixed schedule of incentivized and non-incentivized quizzes, 
students may simply shift effort between weeks rather than increase effort overall. Such 
displacement effects would represent unintended consequences of the new learning (and 
assessment) technique evaluated in this paper. Empirically, this would lead us to overestimate 
the impact of incentives on student effort. In this section we provide a set of direct tests for 
displacement effects across the weeks of our study. 
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Figure 1 and the statistically insignificant estimate for a cohort effect in Table 3 shows 
that participation in weeks without incentives is almost identical across the two groups, which 
is a first indication that the treatment group does not shift effort between weeks with and 
without incentives.  
As our first test of displacement effects, we produce estimates of incentive effects 
relative to participation in the first week of the year (column 1 of Table 4). In the first week, 
fresher students did not know about the incentive structure of future quizzes. The scheme was 
announced only in the second week of term. Indeed, quiz participation in this week is not 
different between the two cohorts (t=0.52), so we use it as our baseline. Participation in week 
1 was relatively high for a week without incentives (see Figure 1), so parameter estimates are 
marginally smaller than those in Table 3. Otherwise they are very similar. More importantly, 
participation in the first and subsequent non-incentivized weeks is not statistically different 
after controlling for a time trend. All results reject the displacement hypothesis and support our 
hypothesis that assessment weighting increases student effort in incentivized weeks but does 
not displace it in other weeks.  
In a second test, we investigate whether an assessment in the previous week may induce 
lower quiz effort in the following week (column 2 of Table 4). We find little evidence that 
lagged assessment weighting incentives affect current quiz participation. The inclusion of 
lagged incentives does not reduce our parameter estimates for contemporaneous incentives (see 
column 1 in Table 3), and neither of the lagged terms is statistically significant. Additionally, 
we reject the null of joint significance of all lagged assessment weight (or compulsion) 
incentives; so again, we find no evidence of displacement effects.  
Thirdly, we pursue an analogous strategy with (one-week) leads in incentives to assess 
whether an upcoming assessed quiz in period t+1 encourages students to participate in non-
incentivized quizzes to practice in advance or obtain feedback. Alternatively, an upcoming quiz 
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could discourage effort in the week before. We find some evidence of anticipatory effects (in 
column 3): upcoming assessment weighted (at 2.5%) or compulsory quizzes increase present 
quiz effort. Contemporaneous incentive estimates do not change much when we include one-
period forward dynamic effects, i.e., leads. Lead incentives for the strongly incentivized weeks 
(weight or compulsory) are jointly statistically significant. Hence, our estimates of the 
contemporaneous incentive effects appear to be underestimating the full effect of incentives: 
they affect participation in the week in which they are implemented but also have anticipatory 
or preparatory effects in the previous week. In summary, if anything, we find evidence of 
positive effort spillovers across weeks, but no evidence of discouragement of effort in non-
incentivized weeks.   
A final piece of evidence against the displacement hypothesis is provided through 
estimates of the impact of assessment weighting on the total number of quizzes Q submitted 
(see column 1 in Table 5). We sum up all weekly quizzes that were submitted before the in-
term exam and estimate the model outlined in equation (3) in Section 2. Again, we find no 
evidence of displacement effects from assessment weighting; the overall number of submitted 
quizzes is significantly larger (1.2 additional quiz or 54%) in the treated group.  
Figure 2 illustrates the shift in the distribution of the total number of completed quizzes. 
In particular we see a sharp drop in the fraction of students not completing any or just one quiz 
before the in-term assessment. For example, the proportion of students who never participate 
in quizzes decreases from 21 to 10%, while the proportion of students who always take quizzes 
increases from 1 to 7%. Additionally, we report a series of estimates on the probability of 
having completed at least n quizzes before the in-term exam (n takes values from 1 to 7) using 
linear probability models (see columns 2 to 8 of Table 5). We find increases in the number of 
submitted quizzes throughout the distribution of quiz effort (along the range of n), suggesting 
a lack of displacement effects not only at the mean but also across the distribution of effort. 
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Our estimate is the largest in the category “at least 2”; note that the median number of submitted 
quizzes in the control group is 2. We find a 56.5% increase in the probability of participating 
in 2 or more quizzes under assessment weighting. We also find large effects in the probability 
of having completed at least 3, 5 or 6 quizzes. Probability increases are largest close to the top, 
at 6 (or more) and 7 submitted quizzes, but this is due to the low frequency of students 
submitting all or almost all quizzes in the control group. In summary, we find that assessment 
weighting increases the probability of providing more effort at all levels, and that it particularly 
activates students with low effort levels (as can also be seen in Figure 2). 
Our results show that assessment weighting strongly affects continuous learning effort 
by students, while other incentives are rather ineffective. We support this with lower bound 
estimates of incentive effects on the intensity and productivity in quizzes. We further show that 
there are no unintended consequences of providing assessment incentives in the form of 
displacement effects on non-incentivized effort across weeks. Total effort increases strongly 
by 54% on average.  
 
3.3 Heterogeneous incentive effects on effort  
We now relax the homogeneity assumption made in equation (1) to examine whether 
incentives have differential effects by gender or along the dimensions of ability and risk 
attitude. Solon et al. (2015) show that ignoring heterogeneous effects may provide inconsistent 
estimates of average effects due to differential subgroup population weights and subgroup-
specific sampling variance. We restrict our analysis to cross-subgroup heterogeneity and 
assume a constant average treatment effect within subgroup. Recent studies incorporate both 
estimates of treatment effects across and within subgroups (Lehrer et al., 2016), and develop 
multiple testing strategies to test for these, while Bitler et al. (2016) develop a test under the 
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null that all heterogeneity is across subgroups. However, since our sub-group contain relatively 
few individuals we refrain from exploring within group heterogeneity. 
We find no evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects by gender or risk attitudes (see 
columns 5 to 8 in Table 6). This is a priori surprising given the evidence in the literature that 
men respond more to competition (see Morin, 2015 for example) but might be driven by the 
design of the competition; rewarding only the best performer with a small prize. In further 
robustness checks, we do not find differential effects along the dimensions of age, subject of 
study, and patience. On the other hand, nationality and self-confidence matter: non-British 
students are more susceptible to incentives, as are self-confident students (see Table C.3 in the 
appendix).   
We are most interested in heterogeneous effects by ability, as these would be indicative 
of whether assessment weighting (or other incentives) may help narrow the ability-performance 
gap by levelling effort. We construct ability quartiles based on university entry grades (for 
details, see Appendix A.1). There is no evidence of an impact of soft incentives (book voucher 
and access to additional study material) on quiz effort in any ability group (see columns 1 to 4 
of Table 6). In contrast, heterogeneity matters for assessment weighting and compulsory 
quizzes; assessment incentives have a stronger impact among students in the lowest ability 
quartile and a lower impact in the top quartile. In weeks with assessment weighting 
(compulsion), lower ability students’ participation in quizzes increases by about 30 (25) 
percentage points more than the participation of students in the top quartile. These differences 
are similar for both weights. One reason for the larger response of low-ability students to 
incentives is that they are 30% less likely to participate in quizzes in the absence of incentives 
than students with above the median ability. Thus, incentives provide stronger motivation to 




3.4 Assessment Weighting Incentives and Student Performance 
If cohort 2 students exert additional effort, i.e. participate in more quizzes, does student 
performance increase as well? We found that incentive-induced quiz effort does not reduce 
effort in non-incentivized quizzes and that assessment weighting induces a sizeable increase in 
total quiz effort. Still, incentives could lead to inter-temporal substitution of effort between 
term time and the exam preparation period, as such additional effort in quizzes may not improve 
performance. On the other hand, even incentives that are shifting effort may have beneficial 
effects: Even if they were neutral in terms of total effort, more continuous studying (during the 
term) may increase overall performance by enabling students to better follow lectures and 
seminars throughout the course. Finally, effort returns may vary depending on the effectiveness 
of the quiz in facilitating learning. For example, compulsory quizzes are good at increasing 
participation but might not be as effective a learning tool since, unlike assessed quizzes, they 
do not reward effort.  
We will return to the question of displacement effects beyond the term in Section 3.5. 
In this section, we estimate the “net of potential displacement” combined effect of the 
effectiveness of quizzes and their impact on grades through increased effort. We present 
reduced form results of the introduction of assessment weighting on student performance based 
on equation (4). Of course, reduced form estimates could capture other performance factors 
that differ between the two cohorts. To test whether the difference in test scores is driven by 
the additional quizzes attempted by students from cohort 2, we extend the reduced form 
specification and include the number of quizzes attempted. If the difference in cohort 
performance is driven by quiz participation, we would expect that the cohort effect would 
become insignificant when we control for quiz participation. In addition, to test whether the 
incentives to participate in quizzes also affected the efficiency of quizzes in improving 
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knowledge, we also include interactions between cohort and the number of quizzes attempted 
(5). 
We first measure short-run performance effects associated with the assessment of 
weekly quizzes. To prevent bias due to variation in exam difficulty or marking standards across 
years, our main estimates rely on grades from term-time tests. These tests consist of multiple-
choice questions randomly drawn for each student from a large question bank, which did not 
change over time. The exams are graded automatically. As a consequence, our performance 
measure is, in expectation, identical across groups and not subject to marking bias. For each 
student, we observe two such exams, one per term. If assessments measure student performance 
with error, observing two exams reduces measurement error as long as the chance components 
of the two exams are uncorrelated. Grades are expressed in terms of standard deviations from 
the average exam grade of cohort 1 so that the average z-score for the first cohort has a mean 
of zero and a standard deviation of one. Exam participation does not substantially differ across 
cohorts, so our results are not driven by selection into the exam. Figure 3 shows that in both 
terms, the grade distribution at the in-term exam, our performance measure, shifts to the right 
for Cohort 2, which was induced to exert more effort via assessment weighting.  
The introduction of assessment weighting increases exam performance by 0.27 of a 
standard deviation, and the estimated coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level (see 
column 1 in Table 7). Next, we look beyond mean exam grades and estimate linear probability 
models for the probability of i) passing the exam (gaining at least 40%), and ii) obtaining an 
Upper Secondary or higher grade (at least 60%), (see columns 3 and 4 of Table 7). We find 
that while pass rates are not affected by assessment weighting (the baseline pass rate for these 
tests is 98%), there is an increase in the probability of obtaining an Upper Secondary grade or 
higher (by 11 percentage points, from a baseline of 73%). We further note that the variance of 
grades in these tests is significantly reduced by 17% (F(267,331)= 1.30). 
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In panel B of Table 7, we present our extended specification which provides a simple 
test that the reduced form estimates can be interpreted causally. When including the number of 
quizzes completed and its interaction with cohort, the cohort effect becomes insignificant; i.e. 
exam grades improve because students in cohort 2 completed more quizzes, not because of 
some other effect affecting cohort 2. Moreover, each completed quiz was as effective in 
producing grades in both cohorts; suggesting again that the two cohorts are similar and that the 
difference in exam performance is driven by the greater quiz completion rate of cohort 2. In 
summary, the two cohorts do not substantially differ in their grades or their returns to quiz 
effort other than through the impact of assessment weighting, which led cohort 2 to attempt 
more quizzes. Hence the increase in effort is productive (and quizzes as a learning tool are 
effective). 
We also assess possible heterogeneity in the effect of assessment weighting on the test 
score by ability level. To do so, we interact ability quartile (based on A-levels or A-level 
equivalents) with the cohort indicator (Table 7, Column 2). The ability by cohort interactions 
are insignificant individually and jointly (F(3,307)=1.41); i.e. the increase in performance is 
observed for all ability groups. In Panel B, we include quiz completed and its interaction with 
cohort and the cohort effect disappears and only quiz completion has a significant correlation 
with test score. As such, we find consistent evidence that the improvement in grades observed 
for the cohort subjected to the assessment weighting of some of the weekly quizzes is correlated 
with quiz participation but not driven by cohort specific effects. While we recognize that quiz 
participation may be endogenously determined by ability and other non-cognitive skills, we 
find all our results to be qualitatively and quantitatively consistent. For example, if we multiply 
the average incentive-induced increase in the number of quizzes (1.266; see Table 5) with the 
effort return from one additional quiz of 0.165 (this is based on a specification which does not 
include the interaction term between quiz numbers and cohort, not reported in Tables), we 
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obtain an overall performance increase that is in the order of magnitude of the grade increase 
estimated in the reduced form specification.  
We assess the possible non-linearity effect of quiz participation (see Table C4 in 
Appendix C). Note, in this specification we also find that cohort has no direct effect when 
controlling for quiz numbers and that the productive effect of quizzes on test score is not cohort 
dependent (F[7,307]=0.49) (column 2). Quiz participation has a significant impact on the in-
term exam grade only when 4 (out of 7) or more quizzes have been completed during the term. 
There is no statistically significant difference in grades from completing 5, 6, or 7 quizzes. 
Since assessment weighting increased the proportion of students completing at least 4 tests by 
40%, we would expect an average improvement on test scores of 0.25 of a standard deviation 
(0.40*0.634), yielding a test score effect that is almost identical to the effect estimated in the 
linear model (which amounts to 0.27 of a standard deviation); i.e. the average performance 
improvement on test score is consistent with the additional effort obtained from assessment 
weighting.  
Overall, assessment weighting increased productive effort, leading to an overall grade 
improvement, mostly for students completing at least 4 or more quizzes per term. We find little 
evidence of heterogeneity by ability but report a relative reduction in grade dispersion 
(measured using the relative standard deviation) by 17%. 
 
3.5 Inter-temporal and inter-subject substitution of effort? 
In Section 3.2, we found no evidence of displacement of effort across weeks. However, 
additional effort during the term may facilitate learning (due to the cumulative pedagogic 
modularity of course contents or the effectiveness of quizzes as a learning tool); or it may 
simply lead to inter-temporal or inter-subject substitution of effort (Fryer and Holden, 2013). 
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We address these considerations in turn. First, if there were displacement effects, the return to 
(the same) quiz effort should be lower among students exposed to assessment weighting. 
However, we find no evidence of differential returns per quiz in Panel B of Table 7, and in 
Table C4 in the appendix.   
Secondly, using the same specifications as for the in-term test grade, we find no 
evidence of an intertemporal shift away from effort outside the term which we measure through 
participation in non-incentivized revision quizzes that were made available during the exam 
preparation period (column 1 in panel A of Table 8).  
Thirdly, we show that the performance increase under assessment weighting that we 
find for our preferred exam measure also applies to the end of year exam in “Principles” and 
the final course grade (see columns 2 and 3). These results should be viewed with caution, as 
the final course grade is directly affected by the additional marks students achieved via quizzes, 
and final exams difficulty and their marking may change between years. While the increase in 
the final exam grade is not statistically significant, the point estimate is very similar to the one 
observed for in-term tests. The overall course grade increases (statistically significantly) by 
0.36 of a standard deviation. As for the in-term exam, we find no effect of assessment weighting 
on passing the course (column 4). 
In the second panel of Table 8, we again report estimates from an extended model that 
includes the number of quizzes and their interaction with a cohort dummy. This is to test 
whether the reduced form estimates are driven by increased quiz participation or other cohort 
differences. Since cohort effects disappear when the number of quizzes is included, our results 
support the interpretation that the reduced form evidence can be interpreted as the effect of 
assessment weighting on final grades via its effect on quiz participation rather than as  
unobserved cohort differences such as differences in exam difficulty or grading bias.  
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Finally, we investigate inter-subject substitution of effort using students’ average grade 
in three other courses that took place in the same study year. While the note of caution discussed 
above applies to the exam measures in these courses, variation in exam difficulty may be 
averaged out across these three compulsory courses. We find that assessment weighting is 
associated with a statistically significant and large increase in the mean grade in these courses, 
by 0.28 of a standard deviation. However, the reduced form effect is unlikely to only capture 
the effect of assessment weighting in “Principles”. For example, unlike “Principles”, these 
courses may have been subject to changes in course materials and course delivery across years. 
In consequence, even when we include quiz participation, the cohort effect remains (Panel B). 
This suggests that the reduced form effect is not solely capturing the increased quiz 
participation, and we should refrain from interpreting any grade improvement in these courses 
solely as a spill-over effect from the change in assessment weighting in “Principles”.  
 
3.6 Incentivized Learning 
We now assess whether the increase in quiz participation due to assessment weighting 
affects longer-run performance. We do this by following “Principles” students into their second 
year and assessing whether they also perform better in two compulsory courses that have 
“Principles” as a pre-requisite. As Table 9 shows, we find positive parameter estimates at the 
mean and for greater scores (above 60%), statistically significant (marginally for the mean 
effect) only for Macroeconomics. The mean effect has the same size effect as in year 1, so 
long-run effects are potentially large. In the second panel, where we include the total number 
of quizzes in year 1 and its interaction with cohort, the cohort effect remains large although 
only marginally statistically significant or insignificant. Hence, the long-run effect might be 





A growing literature explores the role of incentives in fostering learning and improving 
education outcomes (see e.g. Lavecchia, Liu and Oreopoulos (2016) for a review). In this paper, 
we explore a set of possible incentive mechanisms. We find that tournament and pure 
participation incentives are largely ineffective in increasing study effort. In contrast, 
assessment weighting and compulsion are highly effective in inducing additional effort among 
students. Assessment weights need not be very high (and increasing them has diminishing 
marginal returns): in our study, weights of only 2.5% and 5% of the overall course grade trigger 
large participation increases of 45 and 62 percentage points, respectively. We also find that the 
effect of assessment weights varies with students’ ability. High ability students display high 
participation rates in quizzes even in the absence of assessment weighting, so positive 
weighting is particularly effective in increasing effort among low and median ability students. 
Compulsion is even more effective at increasing quiz participation but might be more costly to 
scale up, due to administrative costs associated with checking the validity for excuses of non-
response. Also, while it is effective at increasing participation, compulsion might not generate 
as much “productive effort” as assessment weighting, and thus have a lower impact on learning. 
Recent criticisms of the use of incentives have warned against the danger of crowding out 
intrinsic motivation (see, e.g. Fryer (2011, 2013)). Students may either not respond to them at 
all or they may simply shift effort towards activities that are assessment weighted rather than 
increase effort overall. In this paper, we provide a detailed analysis of effort displacement 
effects. Effort is notoriously hard to measure as it manifests in various forms such as the level 
of endeavor in quizzes, lectures, seminars, self-study time, and varies in time and intensity. In 
this paper we present a broader set of effort measures than in previous studies and thus are able 
to shed new light on both the link between effort and performance and the potential 
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displacement of effort in various domains. All our results point in the same direction: students 
neither displace quiz effort between incentivized and non-incentivized weeks nor do we find 
evidence of effort displacement inter-temporally or across subjects. In contrast, we find some 
indication that there are positive spillovers on effort between weeks, performance in other 
courses in the same year, and marginally, on a related course a year later. 
We conclude that assessment weights – or other mechanisms increasing quiz 
participation in general - are an effective means of improving students’ performance: three 
assessed quizzes with a total weight of 10% of the final grade not only increased quiz 
participation but also grades on in-term tests by 0.27 of a standard deviation. These results 
suggest that there is no displacement of effort throughout the year due to the weekly incentives. 
We find some weak evidence of positive spillovers, but the set-up limits the causal 
interpretation of these estimates. The estimated effect on test-score is large, and similar to those 
found in studies that implemented costly financial incentives (see Angrist et al., 2014, 
Garibaldi et al., 2012 and Leuven et al. 2010). Our estimates are also comparable to the effects 
of relative and absolute feedback found in Bandiera et al. (2015). Note however, that the effects 
are non-linear and driven by getting students to complete at least 4 out of the 7 weekly quizzes, 
so there might be some limits on the efficiency of increasing the frequency of incentivized 
quizzes. 
Recent work particularly tries to address performance deficits among lower ability 
students. These studies mostly focus on using relative achievement targets in the incentive 
design (Behrman et al., 2015) or by targeting teacher performance (Figlio and Kenny, 2007). 
Due to its stronger effect on lower and median ability students, we suggest that assessment 
weighting seems to be an overlooked candidate in this debate: it helps reduce the within-group 
performance gap by about 17%. Future research is needed to investigate the extent to which: 
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lack of self-discipline in study behavior; strong time discounting; or lack of ability, are the 
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Tables and Figures  
 
Figure 1: Weekly quiz participation and incentives 
 
Source:  Total number of students: 206 in Cohort 1 and 240 in Cohort 2 
Note:  Solid vertical lines refer to Assessment 2.5% (Cohort 2 only) 
Dashed vertical lines refer to compulsory quiz (Cohort 1) or Assessment 5% (Cohort 2) 
Dotted vertical lines refer to soft incentives: book voucher and solution provision 
 
Figure 2: Total number of quizzes completed before in-Term Exam  
   
33 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of In-Term Exam grades 
 
 
Table 1: Timing of incentives by cohort 
 Fall Spring 
Week Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 1 Cohort 2 
1 O O O O 
2 O O O O 
3 O Assessed 2.5% O Assessed 2.5% 
4 Solution Solution O O 
5 O Assessed 2.5% Voucher Voucher 
6 Term break Term break 
7 O O O Assessed 2.5% 
8 Compulsory Assessed 5% O O 
9 O O Compulsory Assessed 5% 
10 Voucher Voucher O O 
11 O O Solution* Solution* 
Note: “O”: designates weeks without incentives to complete the online quiz; quiz is pure formative feedback; 
“Solution”: Access to the weekly exercise sheet solutions conditional on quiz participation; * indicates that access 
to solution was conditional on getting a mark of 30 or above.  
“Voucher”: £20 book voucher - prize for best quiz performance; “Assessed 2.5%” (“Assessed 5%”): Assessed 
quiz, counting 2.5% (5%) towards the overall course grade; “Compulsory”: Quiz mandatory part of 4 pieces of 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics  
 Full sample Matched sample 
 Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 1 Cohort 2 
Panel A. Student characteristics 
 
Age  (in months) 233.6  (16.60) 230.5**   (13.70) 227.2  (9.812) 229.1*    (11.48) 
Male 0.529  (0.500) 0.637**   (0.482) 0.643  (0.481) 0.615     (0.488) 
UK citizen 0.294  (0.457) 0.538*** (0.500) 0.582  (0.495) 0.594     (0.492) 
Chinese citizen 0.127  (0.334) 0.081        (0.273) 0.069  (0.254) 0.059     (0.236) 
Econ Major 0.485  (0.501) 0.709*** (0.455) 0.742  (0.439) 0.717      (0.452) 
Abilitya 330.7  (83.81) 303.7*** (66.38) 312.41 (72.83) 306.47    (61.09) 
No. Obs. 204 234 138 187 
Panel B. Student preference parameters and (usually unobserved) characteristics 
 
Confidence 12.986 (2.710) 12.642    (2.606) 12.736 (2.801) 12.632       (2.695) 
Patience 4.349   (5.307) 4.387      (5.363) 4.356   (5.394) 4.032         (5.370) 
Risk attitudes 6.319   (1.451) 6.407      (1.310) 6.295   (1.404) 6.429         (1.253) 
No Obs.  142 155 103 128 




7.838   (4.757) 9.884*** (5.171) 7.650    (7.650) 9.914***   (5.356) 
Quiz grade (%)1  56.68   (10.06) 64.54*** (9.30) 59.16    (9.667) 65.19***   (9.205) 
Quiz duration 
(mins)1  
33.406 (9.62) 34.845     (9.50) 32.764 (8.564) 35.305***(9.651) 
Self-study1  
(hrs per week)  
2.839   (1.532) 4.469***(2.531) 2.788 (1.443) 4.451***   (2.568) 
Lecture 
attendance1  
0.907 (0.185) 0.902       (0.172) 0.940 (0.137) 0.897**     (0.180) 
In-term  
exam grade 
68.13 (12.72) 72.27*** (10.80) 69.66 (12.16) 73.16***   (10.50) 
Final exam gradeb 46.38 (15.50) 50.03**   (16.65) 48.92 (14.24) 52.11**     (15.85) 
No Obs.  204 234 136 183 
Note: ***/** indicate significant mean differences between waves at the 1 or 5% significance level. Standard 
deviations reported in parentheses. Matched samples obtained from kernel matching (Epanechnikov) with 
bandwidth (0.01).  
a: Ability not observed for all participants, sample sizes in the full sample are 145 (202) for Cohort 1(2). 
b: Final grades are observed for 193 (231) students only for Cohort 1 (2). 
1: observed conditional on quiz participation only.  
Econ Major denotes Economics or Economics and Finance students.  
Variables in Panel B are measured in week 1 of term 1 (see appendix A.1): Risk attitudes is the sum of scores 
obtained from the questions: Do you have a personal medical insurance? Do you smoke? Do you take out travel 
insurance? Have you incurred interest charges on your credit cards? Do you play lotteries? Do you have a savings 
account? Did you play slot machines last week? Do you go out of your way to cross the road at pedestrian 
crossings? Do you do any dangerous sport? Confidence is the sum of scores obtained from answers to statements: 
I feel comfortable speaking to a bank manager about loans, I enjoy challenging situations, I’m not scared of being 
in debt, I handle uncertainty well.  Patience is elicited from 5 questions regarding the present values of 
hypothetical prizes one year later.  
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Table 3: Impact of Incentives on Student Effort (measured as quiz participation) 
 Matched sample All Ability Sample 
 FE OLS  
Solution 0.019  (0.032)      0.013  (0.030) 0.018  (0.031) 
Book voucher -0.087 (0.069) -0.091 (0.067) -0.084  (0.066) 
Assess 2.5% 0.420  (0.084)*** 0.413  (0.079)*** 0.411  (0.082)*** 
Assess 5% 0.622  (0.036)*** 0.628  (0.036)*** 0.623  (0.039)*** 
Compulsory 0.727  (0.041)*** 0.693  (0.036)*** 0.686  (0.039)*** 
Cohort 2  0.001  (0.029) 0.014 (0.027) 
Ability Q1   -0.074 (0.015)*** 
Ability Q2   -0.098 (0.013)*** 
Ability Q3   0.026 (0.012)** 
Observations 
[individuals] 
6500 [325] 8480 [424] 6880 [424] 
Test for equality of incentives a 
H0: βAss2.5 = βAss5 F(1,39)=5.0** F(1,39)=6.4** F(1,39)=5.5** 
H0: βAss5 = βComp. F(1,39)=9.97*** F(1,39)=4.6** F(1,39)=3.8 
Note: ***/** indicate statistical significance from zero at the 1 or 5% significance level. 
Estimates are based on the matched sample. Robust standard errors are clustered at the cohort/week level. 
Other independent variables are: an indicator of term, a term-specific time trend, dummies for assessments and 
essays in that week in other modules. In the OLS specification, we include the time-invariant individual 
characteristics – a linear term in age (in months), sex, dummies for Chinese Nationality and other non-UK 
nationalities, and degree subject. Robust standard errors are clustered at cohort/week level  
a: F-tests at the bottom of the table refer to the Null hypothesis of equal parameter estimates i) Assess 2.5% = 





Table 4: Displacement Effects of Incentives on Student Effort Across Weeks (measured 
as quiz participation) 
 FE (rel. to first week) FE + lagged incentiveb FE + forward incentiveb 
No incentives -0.039 (0.071)    
Contemporaneous incentives in t 
Solution -0.015 (0.050) 0.030 (0.052)         -0.039 (0.050) 
Book voucher -0.127 (0.0103) -0.088 (0.099) -0.134 (0.060)** 
Assess 2.5% 0.387 (0.090)*** 0.415 (0.097)*** 0.463 (0.068)*** 
Assess 5% 0.590 (0.067)*** 0.622 (0.096)*** 0.601 (0.052)*** 
Compulsory 0.689 (0.080)*** 0.754 (0.083)*** 0.698 (0.065)*** 
Lags (t-1) respectively leads(t+1)  of incentives 
Solution  -0.070 (0.129) -0.093 (0.084) 
Voucher  -0.010 (0.087) -0.014 (0.048) 
Assessed 2.5%  -0.037 (0.052) 0.114 (0.045)** 
Assessed 5%  -0.016 (0.116) 0.025 (0.059) 









Test for equality of incentives and joint significance of lags (respectively leads):a 
H0: βAss2.5 = βAss5 F(1,33)5.0** F(1,33)=3.4 F(1,33)=2.4 
H0: βAss5 = βComp. 
H0: βlag / lead =0 
F(1,33)=   9.2*** F(1,33)=  5.4** 
F(3,33)=  0.2 
F(1,33)=   8.5*** 
F(3,33)=25.9*** 
Note: ***/** indicate statistical significance from zero at the 1 or 5% significance level. 
Estimates are based on the matched sample. Robust standard errors are clustered at the cohort/week level. Other 
independent variables are: an indicator of term, a term-specific time trend, dummies for assessments and essays 
in that week in other modules. “No incentive” refers to quizzes in weeks without incentives (except for the first 
quiz). a: F-tests are for joint significance of lag (forward) coefficients on assessed quizzes (2.5 and 5%) and 
compulsion.  b: We exclude the first week of each term in columns 2 and 3 to account for holiday breaks.   
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Table 5: Displacement vs Enhancement Effects in the Number of Submitted Quizzes before the in-term Exam 
 Number of Submitted Quizzes before the in-term Exam 
 Nbr  quizzes At least 1 At least 2 At least 3 At least 4 At least 5 At least 6 At least 7 
Cohort 2 1.266*** 0.159*** 0.303*** 0.206*** 0.148** 0.192*** 0.199*** 0.058*** 
 (0.284) (0.048) (0.061) (0.066) (0.070) (0.052) (0.031) (0.13) 
Mean Cohort 1 2.340 0.749 0.536 0.431 0.361 0.202 0.055 0.006 
Mean size effect 
(in %) 
54.1 21.2 56.5 47.8 40.1 95.0 361.8 966.7 
Note: Matched Sample (n= 650 observations; N=325 students);  
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level. ***/** indicate statistical significance from zero at the 1 or 5% significance level.  




Table 6: Heterogeneous incentive effects on student effort (relative to the first week) 
 Ability Gender Risk attitude 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Female Male Low High 
No incentive 0.065 -0.104 -0.062 -0.060 -0.007 -0.058 -0.020 -0.014 
 (0.083) (0.088) (0.108) (0.103) (0.080) (0.072) (0.095) (0.063) 
Solution 0.043 -0.045 -0.018 -0.054 -0.003 -0.022 0.005 -0.016 
 (0.087) (0.074) (0.078) (0.106) (0.072) (0.053) (0.074) (0.056) 
Book voucher 0.001 -0.169 -0.185 -0.205 -0.117 -0.132 -0.108 -0.104 
 (0.095) (0.131) (0.127) (0.132) (0.112) (0.103) (0.133) (0.099) 
Assess 2.5% 0.500*** 0.384*** 0.312*** 0.205 0.364*** 0.400*** 0.377*** 0.341*** 
 (0.110) (0.085) (0.115) (0.138) (0.109) (0.085) (0.116) (0.104) 
Assess 5% 0.679*** 0.575*** 0.564*** 0.389*** 0.606*** 0.574*** 0.595*** 0.554*** 
 (0.083) (0.085) (0.093) (0.110) (0.078) (0.069) (0.093) (0.065) 
Compulsory 0.865*** 0.631*** 0.623*** 0.589*** 0.697*** 0.684*** 0.648*** 0.740*** 

















Observations 1860 2140 1380 1120 2820 3680 2020 2340 
Note:  
Estimates are based on the matched sample. Robust standard errors clustered at the cohort/week level. ***/** indicate statistical significance from zero at the 1 or 5% 
significance level. 






Table 7: Impact of Student Effort on Normalized In-Term Exam Grades 








Panel A     
Cohort 2 0.268** 0.400** 0.008 0.110*** 
 (0.131) (0.203) (0.012) (0.056) 
Ability Q1  -0.074   
* Cohort 2  (0.253)   
Ability Q2  -0.467   
* Cohort 2  (0.372)   
Ability Q3  0.235   
* Cohort 2  (0.279)   
     
Panel B     
Number of   0.204*** 0.216*** 0.003 0.063*** 
Quizzes (0.04751) (0.047) (0.005) (0.020) 
Cohort 2 0.09981 0.302 -0.012 0.037 
 (0.17936) (0.257) (0.020) (0.104) 
Nbr Quizzes -0.0391 -0.064 0.004 -0.009 
* Cohort (0.05046) (0.048) (0.007) (0.024) 
Ability Q1  -0.226   
* Cohort 2  (0.249)   
Ability Q2  -0.382   
* Cohort 2  (0.285)   
Ability Q3  0.333   
* Cohort 2  (0.238)   
     
Observations 600 600 600 600 
     
Note:  
Estimates are based on the matched sample (n= 600 observations ; N=308 students).  
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. ***/** indicate statistical significance from zero at the 1 or 
5% significance level. 
Controls include: dummies for gender, Chinese nationals and other non-UK nationals, subject of degree and 
term, a linear trend in age (in month) and ability quartiles.   
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Course grade Pass Course  Mean grade in 
other courses 
Panel A      
Cohort 2 0.057 0.265 0.359** 0.057 0.281*** 
 (0.076) (0.171) (0.169) (0.052) (0.096) 
Panel B      
Number of   0.059*** 0.114*** 0.115*** 0.022*** 0.067*** 
Quizzes (0.008) (0.027) (0.027) (0.008) (0.010) 
Cohort 2 0.121 0.328 0.194 -0.008 0.424** 
 (0.085) (0.255) (0.240) (0.120) (0.165) 
Nbr Quizzes -0.020** -0.034 -0.011 0.001 -0.030** 
* Cohort (0.010) (0.029) (0.027) (0.010) (0.014) 
Observations 325 325 325 325 325 
Note: Estimates are based on the matched sample.  
***/** indicate statistical significance from zero at the 1 or 5% significance level. 
Estimates are based on the matched sample. Controls include: dummies for gender, Chinese Nationals, other non-
UK nationals, and a linear in age (in month), ability quartiles.   
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Table 9: Learning - Long-run Outcomes 

















































































Observations 272 272 
Note: Estimates are based on the matched sample.  
***/**/* indicate statistical significance from zero at the 1, 5 or 10% significance level. 
Controls include: dummies for gender, Chinese Nationals, other non-UK nationals, and a linear trend in age (in 
month) and ability quartiles.  
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Appendix A: Description of data 
 
Appendix A.1: Variable descriptions 
 
Age: We report age in months rather than years to allow for performance differences by month 
of birth which have been shown to have a substantial effect on educational performance (see 
Crawford et al. 2014). 
Ability: We proxy ability through UCAS tariff scores, i.e. school leaving grades, that were 
obtained before the start of the first year and the natural experiment. For international students, 
we use a combination of the academic equivalencies scales published by the University of 
Brighton (www.brighton.ac.uk/international/equivalencies) and the scales used by the 
admissions office of the College in which we conduct the experiment. We deviate in the 
valuation of the international baccalaureat as the equivalence scales seem too conservative 
given the high quality of this school degree programme.  
Survey-based measures:  
The following variables were obtained from a survey that was run each year at the beginning 
of the year in-class. Response rates for these survey are 74% (67%) for cohort 1 (cohort 2). 
Risk attitudes: These are obtained as the sum of answers on the questions: Do you have a 
personal medical insurance? Do you smoke? Do you take out travel insurance? Have you 
incurred interest charges on your credit cards? Do you play lotteries? Do you have a savings 
account? Did you play slot machines last week? Do you go out of your way to cross the road 
at pedestrian crossings? Do you do any dangerous sport?  Answer options were `yes’ or `no’. 
Higher numbers denote more risk tolerance. 
Patience: These are elicited from five questions regarding the present values of hypothetical 
prizes in one year’s time. Respondents state whether they feel better off, worse off or consider 
the current and future payments equally valuable. Patience is then scored based on their 
answers regarding five payment pairs and lies between -2.5 (very impatient) and 12.5 (very 
patient). 
Self-Confidence: Confidence is the sum of answers obtained from answers to statements: I feel 
comfortable speaking to a bank manager about loans, I enjoy challenging situations, I’m not 
scared of being in debt, I handle uncertainty well. All questions are scored on a Likert scale 
from 1 to 5. Higher values denote more self-confidence. 
 
Appendix A.2: Dropout rates (Sample Attrition) 
 
Drop out is very low at this institution, only 14 students across the two cohorts do not have a 
reported final grade. This includes dropout students as well as visiting students whose visit 
lasted for only one term. On average, these students participated in 3.9 quizzes, and 3 of them 
did not participate in any. These 14 participants do not impact on our main results as they 
cannot be matched and drop out of the analysis. Otherwise, there is no source of attrition as we 




Appendix B: Matching procedure 
 
The matching is obtained using an Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth 0.01 based on a 
program developed by Leuven and Sianesi. The propensity score is estimated by including the 
following variables: age, gender, nationality, major subject and ability (UCAS score);16 
individuals from the second cohort are not matched and are dropped from the analysis. 
Figure B.1 shows the Propensity score distribution and the overlapping support. 
 




0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score




Appendix C: Robustness checks 
 
Appendix C.1: Additional evidence on the impact of incentives on student effort 
Table C.1 shows that assessment weighting increases effort also in terms of the intensity of 
effort, i.e. time spent doing a quiz, and improves quiz performance (statistically significantly 
only for the 5% assessment weighting). The quantitative effect of 5% assessment weighting is 
comparable to that of a compulsory quiz in terms of effort intensity and not much larger than 
for the lower weight of 2.5%.  Table C. 2 shows both cohorts reacted identically to the joint 
incentives they faced – the soft incentives, compulsion (as well as non-incentivized weeks). 
In Table C.3, we find no heterogeneity in the reaction to incentives between economics and 
non-economics majors, by age or patience. There are heterogeneous effects by nationality: 
British students react strongest to incentives, illustrated by significantly lower participation in 
non-incentivized quizzes and increased participation in incentivized ones relative to non-
Chinese foreign students, our base group. Finally, we find that confident students participate 
more in assessment weighted quizzes.  
 
Table C.1: Impact of Incentives on Student Effort, alternative measures 
 Log Time spent per question Normalised Grade  
Book voucher 0.009 (0.128) 0.068 (0.332) 
Solution -0.006 (0.108) -0.211 (0.159) 
Assess 2.5% 0.529 (0.149)*** 0.072 (0.144) 
Assess 5% 0.370 (0.141)** 0.642 (0.194)*** 
Compulsory 0.311 (0.102)*** 1.089 (0.206)*** 
Observations [individuals] 2717 [317] 2723 [317] 
R2 0.26 0.09 
Note: Estimates based on the matched sample and using individual fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered 
at cohort/week level. ***/**/* indicate statistical significance from zero at the 1, 5 or 10% significance level. 
Other independent variables are: an indicator of term, term-specific trend, gender, Chinese National, other non-
UK national dummies, subject of degree and a linear term in age (in month), dummies for assessments in that 
week in other modules, essay in that week in other modules.  
Table C.2: Impact of Incentives on Student Effort for both Cohorts  
Quiz participation Quiz participation 
No incentives -0.021 (0.065) -0.015 (0.062) 
No incentive * Cohort 2   -0.014 (0.039) 
Soft incentives -0.047 (0.061) -0.060 (0.075) 
Soft incentives * Cohort 2   0.024 (0.054) 
Assess 2.5% 0.399 (0.092) *** 0.397 (0.094) *** 
Assess 5% 0.622 (0.056) ***  0.619 (0.062) ***  






6500 [325]  
H0: βnone*coh2= βsoft*coh2=0   F(2,39)=0.16 
Note: Estimates based on the matched sample and using individual fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered 
at cohort/week level. ***/**/* indicate statistical significance from zero at the 1, 5 or 10% significance level. 
Other independent variables are: an indicator of term, a term-specific time trend, dummies for gender, Chinese 
Nationality and other non-UK nationalities, subject of degree and a linear term in age (in months), dummies for 
assessments and essays in that week in other modules.  “No incentive” refers to quizzes in weeks without 
incentives (except for the first quiz).  
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Table C.3: Heterogeneous incentive effects on student effort  









median Low High Low High 
No incentive -0.106 0.056 -0.059 0.014 -0.090 0.049 -0.079 -0.011 -0.023 -0.033 
 (0.092) (0.088) (0.078) (0.065) (0.086) (0.077) (0.090) (0.066) (0.080) (0.070) 
Solution -0.082 0.081 -0.026 0.015 -0.047 0.041 -0.056 0.015 -0.009 -0.014 
 (0.071) (0.085) (0.057) (0.059) (0.061) (0.074) (0.074) (0.052) (0.064) (0.054) 
Book  -0.201 -0.021 -0.134 -0.107 -0.185 -0.027 -0.191 -0.082 -0.119 -0.111 
voucher (0.129) (0.0105) (0.105) (0.113) (0.119) (0.098) (0.119) (0.099) (0.113) (0.109) 
Assess 2.5% 0.309*** 0.497*** 0.395*** 0.367*** 0.354*** 0.445*** 0.322*** 0.433*** 0.329*** 0.393*** 
 (0.103) (0.113) (0.084) (0.115) (0.102) (0.096) (0.114) (0.079) (0.094) (0.087) 
Assess 5% 0.497*** 0.712*** 0.573*** 0.620*** 0.544*** 0.659*** 0.498*** 0.650*** 0.558*** 0.582*** 
 (0.090) (0.091) (0.072) (0.071) (0.081) (0.082) (0.086) (0.066) (0.081) (0.068) 
Compulsory 0.605*** 0.808*** 0.708*** 0.631*** 0.615*** 0.821*** 0.611*** 0.743*** 0.686*** 0.688*** 























Observations 3380 3120 4100 2400 3820 2680 2880 3620 2400 2100 
Note: Weights obtained from propensity score matching. Robust standard errors clustered at the cohort/week level. ***/**/* indicate statistical significance from zero at the 1, 
5 or 10% significance level. 
 Other independent variables are: an indicator of term, a term-specific linear time trend and a dummy for assessments (essays) due in the same week in other modules.  
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Appendix C.2: Additional evidence on the impact of effort on student performance 
 
C.2.1 Non-linear effort effects 
Finally, we allow for nonlinear effort effects on performance using dummies for the number of 
quizzes (Table C.4). In column 1, we find a discontinuous jump in exam performance at 4, and 
a smaller increase at 5 quizzes (relative to never taking a quiz). Higher effort, i.e. doing 6 or 7 
quizzes does not result in a significant increase in performance relative to submitting 5 quizzes. 
Again, these estimates are robust to allowing for cohort-specific effort returns as column 2 
shows. Furthermore, while we find evidence for the joint significance of the (non-linear) quiz 
dummies, we do not find evidence that they are statistically significantly different across 
cohorts (F-statistic- 0.49).      
 
Table C.4: Impact of Student Effort on Normalized In-Term Exam Grades. 
 OLS OLS 
Nbr Quizzes   
Cohort 2 0.003 (0.105) 0.246 (0.269) 
1 Quiz -0.095 (0.280) -0.085 (0.326) 
2 Quizzes 0.267 (0.208) 0.187 (0.263) 
3 Quizzes 0.352 (0.223) 0.436 (0.246)* 
4 Quizzes 0.634 (0.278)** 0.672 (0.345)* 
5 Quizzes 0.824 (0.239)*** 0.872 (0.255)*** 
6 Quizzes 0.833 (0.261)*** 0.742 (0.320)** 
7 Quizzes 0.842 (0.228)*** 0.981 (0.340)*** 
Quiz * cohort 2  Yes 
F-test 
quiz dummies F(7,307) 7.82*** 5.08*** 
across cohorts F(7,307)  0.49 
Note: Other controls as in Table 7. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the individual level.  
quiz dummies F(7,307) reports the results from a test of joint significance of the number of quizzes completed 
variables.  
Across cohorts F(7,307) reports the results from a test of joint significance of the interaction terms between 
number of quizzes and cohort. 
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